How to cope with your abuser?Sometimes it looks hopeless. II. Issues in
Calculus of Rights
IIA. The Hierarchy of Rights
All human cultures have hierarchies of rights. These hierarchies reflect cultural mores and lores and there cannot, therefore, be a universal, or eternal hierarchy.
In Western moral systems,
Right to Life supersedes all other rights (including
right to one's body, to comfort, to
avoidance of pain, to property, etc.).
Yet, this hierarchical arrangement does not help us to resolve cases in which there is a clash of EQUAL rights (for instance,
conflicting rights to life of two people). One way to decide among equally potent claims is randomly (by flipping a coin, or casting dice). Alternatively, we could add and subtract rights in a somewhat macabre arithmetic. If a mother's life is endangered by
continued existence of a fetus and assuming both of them have a right to life we can decide to kill
fetus by adding to
mother's right to life her right to her own body and thus outweighing
fetus' right to life.
IIB. The Difference between Killing and Letting Die
There is an assumed difference between killing (taking life) and letting die (not saving a life). This is supported by IE above. While there is a right not to be killed - there is no right to have one's own life saved. Thus, while there is an obligation not to kill - there is no obligation to save a life.
IIC. Killing
Innocent
Often
continued existence of an innocent person (IP) threatens to take
life of a victim (V). By "innocent" we mean "not guilty" - not responsible for killing V, not intending to kill V, and not knowing that V will be killed due to IP's actions or continued existence.
It is simple to decide to kill IP to save V if IP is going to die anyway shortly, and
remaining life of V, if saved, will be much longer than
remaining life of IP, if not killed. All other variants require a calculus of hierarchically weighted rights. (See "Abortion and
Sanctity of Human Life" by Baruch A. Brody).
One form of calculus is
utilitarian theory. It calls for
maximization of utility (life, happiness, pleasure). In other words,
life, happiness, or pleasure of
many outweigh
life, happiness, or pleasure of
few. It is morally permissible to kill IP if
lives of two or more people will be saved as a result and there is no other way to save their lives. Despite strong philosophical objections to some of
premises of utilitarian theory - I agree with its practical prescriptions.
In this context -
dilemma of killing
innocent - one can also call upon
right to self defence. Does V have a right to kill IP regardless of any moral calculus of rights? Probably not. One is rarely justified in taking another's life to save one's own. But such behaviour cannot be condemned. Here we have
flip side of
confusion - understandable and perhaps inevitable behaviour (self defence) is mistaken for a MORAL RIGHT. That most V's would kill IP and that we would all sympathize with V and understand its behaviour does not mean that V had a RIGHT to kill IP. V may have had a right to kill IP - but this right is not automatic, nor is it all-encompassing.
But is
Egg - Alive?
This question is NOT equivalent to
ancient quandary of "when does life begin". Life crystallizes, at
earliest, when an egg and a sperm unite (i.e., at
moment of fertilization). Life is not a potential - it is a process triggered by an event. An unfertilized egg is neither a process - nor an event. It does not even possess
potential to become alive unless and until it merges with a sperm. Should such merger not occur - it will never develop life.
The potential to become X is not
ontological equivalent of actually being X, nor does it spawn moral and ethical rights and obligations pertaining to X. The transition from potential to being is not trivial, nor is it automatic, or inevitable, or independent of context. Atoms of various elements have
potential to become an egg (or, for that matter, a human being) - yet no one would claim that they ARE an egg (or a human being), or that they should be treated as one (i.e., with
same rights and obligations).
Moreover, it is
donor nucleus embedded in
egg that endows it with life -
life of
cloned baby. Yet,
nucleus is usually extracted from a muscle or
skin. Should we treat a muscle or a skin cell with
same reverence
critics of cloning wish to accord an unfertilized egg?
Is This
Main Concern?
The main concern is that cloning - even
therapeutic kind - will produce piles of embryos. Many of them - close to 95% with current biotechnology - will die. Others can be surreptitiously and illegally implanted in
wombs of "surrogate mothers".
It is patently immoral, goes
precautionary argument, to kill so many embryos. Cloning is such a novel technique that its success rate is still unacceptably low. There are alternative ways to harvest stem cells - less costly in terms of human life. If we accept that life begins at
moment of fertilization, this argument is valid. But it also implies that - once cloning becomes safer and scientists more adept - cloning itself should be permitted.
This is anathema to those who fear a slippery slope. They abhor
very notion of "unnatural" conception. To them, cloning is a narcissistic act and an ignorant and dangerous interference in nature's sagacious ways. They would ban procreative cloning, regardless of how safe it is. Therapeutic cloning - with its mounds of discarded fetuses - will allow rogue scientists to cross
boundary between permissible (curative cloning) and illegal (baby cloning).