The Debate about Cloning - Part I

Written by Sam Vaknin


How to cope with your abuser?

Sometimes it looks hopeless. There are two types of cloning. One involves harvesting stem cells from embryos ("therapeutic cloning"). These arerepparttar biological equivalent of a template. They can develop into any kind of mature functional cell and thus help cure many degenerative and auto-immune diseases.

The other kind of cloning is much derided in popular culture - and elsewhere - asrepparttar 115515 harbinger of a Brave, New World. A nucleus from any cell of a donor is embedded in an egg whose own nucleus has been removed. The egg is then implanted in a woman's womb and a cloned baby is born nine months later. Biologically,repparttar 115516 cloned infant is a replica ofrepparttar 115517 donor.

Cloning is often confused with other advances in bio-medicine and bio-engineering - such as genetic selection. It cannot - in itself - be used to produce "perfect humans" or select sex or other traits. Hence, some ofrepparttar 115518 arguments against cloning are either specious or fuelled by ignorance.

It is true, though, that cloning, used in conjunction with other bio-technologies, raises serious bio-ethical questions. Scare scenarios of humans cultivated in sinister labs as sources of spare body parts, "designer babies", "master races", or "genetic sex slaves" - formerlyrepparttar 115519 preserve of B sci-fi movies - have invaded mainstream discourse.

Still, cloning touches upon Mankind's most basic fears and hopes. It invokesrepparttar 115520 most intractable ethical and moral dilemmas. As an inevitable result,repparttar 115521 debate is often more passionate than informed.

I. Right to Life Arguments

According to cloning's detractors,repparttar 115522 nucleus removed fromrepparttar 115523 egg could otherwise have developed into a human being. Thus, removingrepparttar 115524 nucleus amounts to murder.

It is a fundamental principle of most moral theories that all human beings have a right to life. The existence of a right implies obligations or duties of third parties towardsrepparttar 115525 right-holder. One has a right AGAINST other people. The fact that one possesses a certain right - prescribes to others certain obligatory behaviours and proscribes certain acts or omissions. This Janus-like nature of rights and duties as two sides ofrepparttar 115526 same ethical coin - creates great confusion. People often and easily confuse rights and their attendant duties or obligations withrepparttar 115527 morally decent, or even withrepparttar 115528 morally permissible. What one MUST do as a result of another's right - should never be confused with one SHOULD or OUGHT to do morally (inrepparttar 115529 absence of a right).

The right to life has eight distinct strains:

IA. The right to be brought to life

IB. The right to be born

IC. The right to have one's life maintained

ID. The right not to be killed

IE. The right to have one's life saved

IF. The right to save one's life (erroneously limited torepparttar 115530 right to self-defence)

IG. The right to terminate one's life

IH. The right to have one's life terminated

IA. The Right to be Brought to Life

Only living people have rights. There is a debate whether an egg is a living person - but there can be no doubt that it exists. Its rights - whatever they are - derive fromrepparttar 115531 fact that it exists and that it hasrepparttar 115532 potential to develop life. The right to be brought to life (the right to become or to be) pertains to a yet non-alive entity and, therefore, is null and void. Had this right existed, it would have implied an obligation or duty to give life torepparttar 115533 unborn andrepparttar 115534 not yet conceived. No such duty or obligation exist.

IB. The Right to be Born

The right to be born crystallizes atrepparttar 115535 moment of voluntary and intentional fertilization. If a scientist knowingly and intentionally causes in vitro fertilization forrepparttar 115536 explicit and express purpose of creating an embryo - thenrepparttar 115537 resulting fertilized egg has a right to mature and be born. Furthermore,repparttar 115538 born child has allrepparttar 115539 rights a child has against his parents: food, shelter, emotional nourishment, education, and so on.

It is debatable whether such rights ofrepparttar 115540 fetus and, later, ofrepparttar 115541 child, exist if there was no positive act of fertilization - but, onrepparttar 115542 contrary, an act which prevents possible fertilization, such asrepparttar 115543 removal ofrepparttar 115544 nucleus (see IC below).

IC. The Right to Have One's Life Maintained

Does one haverepparttar 115545 right to maintain one's life and prolong them at other people's expense? Does one haverepparttar 115546 right to use other people's bodies, their property, their time, their resources and to deprive them of pleasure, comfort, material possessions, income, or any other thing?

The answer is yes and no.

No one has a right to sustain his or her life, maintain, or prolong them at another INDIVIDUAL's expense (no matter how minimal and insignificantrepparttar 115547 sacrifice required is). Still, if a contract has been signed - implicitly or explicitly - betweenrepparttar 115548 parties, then such a right may crystallize inrepparttar 115549 contract and create corresponding duties and obligations, moral, as well as legal.

The Debate about Cloning - Part II

Written by Sam Vaknin


How to cope with your abuser?

Sometimes it looks hopeless. II. Issues inrepparttar Calculus of Rights

IIA. The Hierarchy of Rights

All human cultures have hierarchies of rights. These hierarchies reflect cultural mores and lores and there cannot, therefore, be a universal, or eternal hierarchy.

In Western moral systems,repparttar 115514 Right to Life supersedes all other rights (includingrepparttar 115515 right to one's body, to comfort, torepparttar 115516 avoidance of pain, to property, etc.).

Yet, this hierarchical arrangement does not help us to resolve cases in which there is a clash of EQUAL rights (for instance,repparttar 115517 conflicting rights to life of two people). One way to decide among equally potent claims is randomly (by flipping a coin, or casting dice). Alternatively, we could add and subtract rights in a somewhat macabre arithmetic. If a mother's life is endangered byrepparttar 115518 continued existence of a fetus and assuming both of them have a right to life we can decide to killrepparttar 115519 fetus by adding torepparttar 115520 mother's right to life her right to her own body and thus outweighingrepparttar 115521 fetus' right to life.

IIB. The Difference between Killing and Letting Die

There is an assumed difference between killing (taking life) and letting die (not saving a life). This is supported by IE above. While there is a right not to be killed - there is no right to have one's own life saved. Thus, while there is an obligation not to kill - there is no obligation to save a life.

IIC. Killingrepparttar 115522 Innocent

Oftenrepparttar 115523 continued existence of an innocent person (IP) threatens to takerepparttar 115524 life of a victim (V). By "innocent" we mean "not guilty" - not responsible for killing V, not intending to kill V, and not knowing that V will be killed due to IP's actions or continued existence.

It is simple to decide to kill IP to save V if IP is going to die anyway shortly, andrepparttar 115525 remaining life of V, if saved, will be much longer thanrepparttar 115526 remaining life of IP, if not killed. All other variants require a calculus of hierarchically weighted rights. (See "Abortion andrepparttar 115527 Sanctity of Human Life" by Baruch A. Brody).

One form of calculus isrepparttar 115528 utilitarian theory. It calls forrepparttar 115529 maximization of utility (life, happiness, pleasure). In other words,repparttar 115530 life, happiness, or pleasure ofrepparttar 115531 many outweighrepparttar 115532 life, happiness, or pleasure ofrepparttar 115533 few. It is morally permissible to kill IP ifrepparttar 115534 lives of two or more people will be saved as a result and there is no other way to save their lives. Despite strong philosophical objections to some ofrepparttar 115535 premises of utilitarian theory - I agree with its practical prescriptions.

In this context -repparttar 115536 dilemma of killingrepparttar 115537 innocent - one can also call uponrepparttar 115538 right to self defence. Does V have a right to kill IP regardless of any moral calculus of rights? Probably not. One is rarely justified in taking another's life to save one's own. But such behaviour cannot be condemned. Here we haverepparttar 115539 flip side ofrepparttar 115540 confusion - understandable and perhaps inevitable behaviour (self defence) is mistaken for a MORAL RIGHT. That most V's would kill IP and that we would all sympathize with V and understand its behaviour does not mean that V had a RIGHT to kill IP. V may have had a right to kill IP - but this right is not automatic, nor is it all-encompassing.

But isrepparttar 115541 Egg - Alive?

This question is NOT equivalent torepparttar 115542 ancient quandary of "when does life begin". Life crystallizes, atrepparttar 115543 earliest, when an egg and a sperm unite (i.e., atrepparttar 115544 moment of fertilization). Life is not a potential - it is a process triggered by an event. An unfertilized egg is neither a process - nor an event. It does not even possessrepparttar 115545 potential to become alive unless and until it merges with a sperm. Should such merger not occur - it will never develop life.

The potential to become X is notrepparttar 115546 ontological equivalent of actually being X, nor does it spawn moral and ethical rights and obligations pertaining to X. The transition from potential to being is not trivial, nor is it automatic, or inevitable, or independent of context. Atoms of various elements haverepparttar 115547 potential to become an egg (or, for that matter, a human being) - yet no one would claim that they ARE an egg (or a human being), or that they should be treated as one (i.e., withrepparttar 115548 same rights and obligations).

Moreover, it isrepparttar 115549 donor nucleus embedded inrepparttar 115550 egg that endows it with life -repparttar 115551 life ofrepparttar 115552 cloned baby. Yet,repparttar 115553 nucleus is usually extracted from a muscle orrepparttar 115554 skin. Should we treat a muscle or a skin cell withrepparttar 115555 same reverencerepparttar 115556 critics of cloning wish to accord an unfertilized egg?

Is Thisrepparttar 115557 Main Concern?

The main concern is that cloning - evenrepparttar 115558 therapeutic kind - will produce piles of embryos. Many of them - close to 95% with current biotechnology - will die. Others can be surreptitiously and illegally implanted inrepparttar 115559 wombs of "surrogate mothers".

It is patently immoral, goesrepparttar 115560 precautionary argument, to kill so many embryos. Cloning is such a novel technique that its success rate is still unacceptably low. There are alternative ways to harvest stem cells - less costly in terms of human life. If we accept that life begins atrepparttar 115561 moment of fertilization, this argument is valid. But it also implies that - once cloning becomes safer and scientists more adept - cloning itself should be permitted.

This is anathema to those who fear a slippery slope. They abhorrepparttar 115562 very notion of "unnatural" conception. To them, cloning is a narcissistic act and an ignorant and dangerous interference in nature's sagacious ways. They would ban procreative cloning, regardless of how safe it is. Therapeutic cloning - with its mounds of discarded fetuses - will allow rogue scientists to crossrepparttar 115563 boundary between permissible (curative cloning) and illegal (baby cloning).

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