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Amnesty International - who should know better - professed to have been shocked by
results of their own surveys:
"In preparing for its third international campaign to stop torture, Amnesty International conducted a survey of its research files on 195 countries and territories. The survey covered
period from
beginning of 1997 to mid-2000. Information on torture is usually concealed, and reports of torture are often hard to document, so
figures almost certainly underestimate its extent. The statistics are shocking. There were reports of torture or ill-treatment by state officials in more than 150 countries. In more than 70, they were widespread or persistent. In more than 80 countries, people reportedly died as a result."
Countries and regimes abstain from torture - or, more often, claim to do so - because such overt abstention is expedient. It is a form of global political correctness, a policy choice intended to demonstrate common values and to extract concessions or benefits from others. Giving up this efficient weapon in
law enforcement arsenal even in Damoclean circumstances is often rewarded with foreign direct investment, military aid, and other forms of support.
But such ethical magnanimity is a luxury in times of war, or when faced with a threat to innocent life. Even
courts of
most liberal societies sanctioned atrocities in extraordinary circumstances. Here
law conforms both with common sense and with formal, utilitarian, ethics.
II. Ethical Considerations
Rights - whether moral or legal - impose obligations or duties on third parties towards
right-holder. One has a right AGAINST other people and thus can prescribe to them certain obligatory behaviors and proscribe certain acts or omissions. Rights and duties are two sides of
same Janus-like ethical coin.
This duality confuses people. They often erroneously identify rights with their attendant duties or obligations, with
morally decent, or even with
morally permissible. One's rights inform other people how they MUST behave towards one - not how they SHOULD, or OUGHT to act morally. Moral behavior is not dependent on
existence of a right. Obligations are.
To complicate matters further, many apparently simple and straightforward rights are amalgams of more basic moral or legal principles. To treat such rights as unities is to mistreat them.
Take
right not to be tortured. It is a compendium of many distinct rights, among them:
right to bodily and mental integrity,
right to avoid self-incrimination,
right not to be pained, or killed,
right to save one's life (wrongly reduced merely to
right to self-defense),
right to prolong one's life (e.g., by receiving medical attention), and
right not to be forced to lie under duress.
None of these rights is self-evident, or unambiguous, or universal, or immutable, or automatically applicable. It is safe to say, therefore, that these rights are not primary - but derivative, nonessential, or mere "wants".
Moreover,
fact that
torturer also has rights whose violation may justify torture is often overlooked.
Consider these two, for instance:
The Rights of Third Parties against
Tortured
What is just and what is unjust is determined by an ethical calculus, or a social contract - both in constant flux. Still, it is commonly agreed that every person has
right not to be tortured, or killed unjustly.
Yet, even if we find an Archimedean immutable point of moral reference - does A's right not to be tortured, let alone killed, mean that third parties are to refrain from enforcing
rights of other people against A?
What if
only way to right wrongs committed, or about to be committed by A against others - was to torture, or kill A? There is a moral obligation to right wrongs by restoring, or safeguarding
rights of those wronged, or about to be wronged by A.
If
defiant silence - or even
mere existence - of A are predicated on
repeated and continuous violation of
rights of others (especially their right to live), and if these people object to such violation - then A must be tortured, or killed if that is
only way to right
wrong and re-assert
rights of A's victims.
This, ironically, is
argument used by liberals to justify abortion when
fetus (in
role of A) threatens his mother's rights to health and life.
The Right to Save One's Own Life
One has a right to save one's life by exercising self-defense or otherwise, by taking certain actions, or by avoiding them. Judaism - as well as other religious, moral, and legal systems - accepts that one has
right to kill a pursuer who knowingly and intentionally is bent on taking one's life. Hunting down Osama bin-Laden in
wilds of Afghanistan is, therefore, morally acceptable (though not morally mandatory). So is torturing his minions.
When there is a clash between equally potent rights - for instance,
conflicting rights to life of two people - we can decide among them randomly (by flipping a coin, or casting dice). Alternatively, we can add and subtract rights in a somewhat macabre arithmetic. The right to life definitely prevails over
right to comfort, bodily integrity, absence of pain and so on. Where life is at stake, non-lethal torture is justified by any ethical calculus.
Utilitarianism - a form of crass moral calculus - calls for
maximization of utility (life, happiness, pleasure). The lives, happiness, or pleasure of
many outweigh
life, happiness, or pleasure of
few. If by killing or torturing
few we (a) save
lives of
many (b)
combined life expectancy of
many is longer than
combined life expectancy of
few and (c) there is no other way to save
lives of
many - it is morally permissible to kill, or torture
few.
III. The Social Treaty
There is no way to enforce certain rights without infringing on others. The calculus of ethics relies on implicit and explicit quantitative and qualitative hierarchies. The rights of
many outweigh certain rights of
few. Higher-level rights - such as
right to life - override rights of a lower order.
The rights of individuals are not absolute but "prima facie". They are restricted both by
rights of others and by
common interest. They are inextricably connected to duties towards other individuals in particular and
community in general. In other words, though not dependent on idiosyncratic cultural and social contexts, they are an integral part of a social covenant.
It can be argued that a suspect has excluded himself from
social treaty by refusing to uphold
rights of others - for instance, by declining to collaborate with law enforcement agencies in forestalling an imminent disaster. Such inaction amounts to
abrogation of many of one's rights (for instance,
right to be free). Why not apply this abrogation to his or her right not to be tortured?
