Abortion and the Right to Life - Part IIIWritten by Sam Vaknin
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Still, not every immoral act involving termination of life can be classified as murder. Phenomenology is deceiving: acts look same (cessation of life functions, prevention of a future). But murder is intentional termination of life of a human who possesses, at moment of death, a consciousness (and, in most cases, a free will, especially will not to die). Abortion is intentional termination of a life which has potential to develop into a person with consciousness and free will. Philosophically, no identity can be established between potential and actuality. The destruction of paints and cloth is not tantamount (not to say identical) to destruction of a painting by Van Gogh, made up of these very elements. Paints and cloth are converted to a painting through intermediacy and agency of Painter. A cluster of cells a human makes only through agency of Nature. Surely, destruction of painting materials constitutes an offence against Painter. In same way, destruction of fetus constitutes an offence against Nature. But there is no denying that in both cases, no finished product was eliminated. Naturally, this becomes less and less so (the severity of terminating act increases) as process of creation advances. Classifying an abortion as murder poses numerous and insurmountable philosophical problems. No one disputes now common view that main crime committed in aborting a pregnancy – is a crime against potentialities. If so, what is philosophical difference between aborting a fetus and destroying a sperm and an egg? These two contain all information (=all potential) and their destruction is philosophically no less grave than destruction of a fetus. The destruction of an egg and a sperm is even more serious philosophically: creation of a fetus limits set of all potentials embedded in genetic material to one fetus created. The egg and sperm can be compared to famous wave function (state vector) in quantum mechanics – represent millions of potential final states (=millions of potential embryos and lives). The fetus is collapse of wave function: it represents a much more limited set of potentials. If killing an embryo is murder because of elimination of potentials – how should we consider intentional elimination of many more potentials through masturbation and contraception? The argument that it is difficult to say which sperm cell will impregnate egg is not serious. Biologically, it does not matter – they all carry same genetic content. Moreover, would this counter-argument still hold if, in future, we were be able to identify chosen one and eliminate only it? In many religions (Catholicism) contraception is murder. In Judaism, masturbation is "the corruption of seed" and such a serious offence that it is punishable by strongest religious penalty: eternal ex-communication ("Karet"). If abortion is indeed murder how should we resolve following moral dilemmas and questions (some of them patently absurd): Is a natural abortion equivalent of manslaughter (through negligence)? Do habits like smoking, drug addiction, vegetarianism – infringe upon right to life of embryo? Do they constitute a violation of contract? Reductio ad absurdum: if, in far future, research will unequivocally prove that listening to a certain kind of music or entertaining certain thoughts seriously hampers embryonic development – should we apply censorship to Mother? Should force majeure clauses be introduced to Mother-Embryo pregnancy contract? Will they give mother right to cancel contract? Will embryo have a right to terminate contract? Should asymmetry persist: Mother will have no right to terminate – but embryo will, or vice versa? Being a rights holder, can embryo (=the State) litigate against his Mother or Third Parties (the doctor that aborted him, someone who hit his mother and brought about a natural abortion) even after he died? Should anyone who knows about an abortion be considered an accomplice to murder? If abortion is murder – why punish it so mildly? Why is there a debate regarding this question? "Thou shalt not kill" is a natural law, it appears in virtually every legal system. It is easily and immediately identifiable. The fact that abortion does not "enjoy" same legal and moral treatment says a lot.

Sam Vaknin is the author of Malignant Self Love - Narcissism Revisited and After the Rain - How the West Lost the East. He is a columnist for Central Europe Review, United Press International (UPI) and eBookWeb and the editor of mental health and Central East Europe categories in The Open Directory, Suite101 and searcheurope.com. Visit Sam's Web site at http://samvak.tripod.com
| | The Murder of Oneself Written by Sam Vaknin
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This is where life ends and social judgement commences. Society cannot admit that it is against freedom of expression (suicide is, after all, a statement). It never could. It always preferred to cast suicides in role of criminals (and, therefore, bereft of any or many civil rights). According to still prevailing views, suicide violates unwritten contracts with himself, with others (society) and, many might add, with God (or with Nature with a capital N). Thomas Aquinas said that suicide was not only unnatural (organisms strive to survive, not to self annihilate) – but it also adversely affects community and violates God's property rights. The latter argument is interesting: God is supposed to own soul and it is a gift (in Jewish writings, a deposit) to individual. A suicide, therefore, has to do with abuse or misuse of God's possessions, temporarily lodged in a corporeal mansion. This implies that suicide affects eternal, immutable soul. Aquinas refrains from elaborating exactly how a distinctly physical and material act alters structure and / or properties of something as ethereal as soul. Hundreds of years later, Blackstone, codifier of British Law, concurred. The state, according to this juridical mind, has a right to prevent and to punish for suicide and for attempted suicide. Suicide is self-murder, he wrote, and, therefore, a grave felony. In certain countries, this still is case. In Israel, for instance, a soldier is considered to be "army property" and any attempted suicide is severely punished as being "attempt at corrupting army possessions". Indeed, this is paternalism at its worst, kind that objectifies its subjects. People are treated as possessions in this malignant mutation of benevolence. Such paternalism acts against adults expressing fully informed consent. It is an explicit threat to autonomy, freedom and privacy. Rational, fully competent adults should be spared this form of state intervention. It served as a magnificent tool for suppression of dissidence in places like Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany. Mostly, it tends to breed "victimless crimes". Gamblers, homosexuals, communists, suicides – list is long. All have been "protected from themselves" by Big Brothers in disguise. Wherever humans possess a right – there is a correlative obligation not to act in a way that will prevent exercise of such right, whether actively (preventing it), or passively (reporting it). In many cases, not only is suicide consented to by a competent adult (in full possession of his faculties) – it also increases utility both for individual involved and for society. The only exception is, of course, where minors or incompetent adults (the mentally retarded, mentally insane, etc.) are involved. Then a paternalistic obligation seems to exist. I use cautious term "seems" because life is such a basic and deep set phenomenon that even incompetents can fully gauge its significance and make "informed" decisions, in my view. In any case, no one is better able to evaluate quality of life (and ensuing justifications of a suicide) of a mentally incompetent person – than that person himself. The paternalists claim that no competent adult will ever decide to commit suicide. No one in "his right mind" will elect this option. This contention is, of course, obliterated both by history and by psychology. But a derivative argument seems to be more forceful. Some people whose suicides were prevented felt very happy that they were. They felt elated to have gift of life back. Isn't this sufficient a reason to intervene? Absolutely, not. All of us are engaged in making irreversible decisions. For some of these decisions, we are likely to pay very dearly. Is this a reason to stop us from making them? Should state be allowed to prevent a couple from marrying because of genetic incompatibility? Should an overpopulated country institute forced abortions? Should smoking be banned for higher risk groups? The answers seem to be clear and negative. There is a double moral standard when it comes to suicide. People are permitted to destroy their lives only in certain prescribed ways. And if very notion of suicide is immoral, even criminal – why stop at individuals? Why not apply same prohibition to political organizations (such as Yugoslav Federation or USSR or East Germany or Czechoslovakia, to mention four recent examples)? To groups of people? To institutions, corporations, funds, not for profit organizations, international organizations and so on? This fast deteriorates to land of absurdities, long inhabited by opponents of suicide.

Sam Vaknin is the author of Malignant Self Love - Narcissism Revisited and After the Rain - How the West Lost the East. He is a columnist for Central Europe Review, United Press International (UPI) and eBookWeb and the editor of mental health and Central East Europe categories in The Open Directory, Suite101 and searcheurope.com. Visit Sam's Web site at http://samvak.tripod.com
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